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1. Introduction 
The SR-530 mudslide occurred between Oso and Darrington 
in the state of Washington on March 22, 2014. It killed 43 peo-
ple, destroyed 49 homes, and disrupted the course and flood 
zone of the Stillaguamish River. The sporadic river flooding 
and sloughing of the mudslide posed a threat to recovery 
workers working downslope, and it continues to influence 
the future safety of residents along the river. 
Small unmanned aerial systems (SUASs) were used to fill 
in gaps in sensing of the geological and hydrological state 
of the mudslide during the response phase, which helped to 
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Abstract 
The Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue deployed three commercially available small unmanned aerial sys-
tems (SUASs)—an AirRobot AR100B quadrotor, an Insitu Scan Eagle, and a PrecisionHawk Lancaster—to the 2014 
SR-530 Washington State mudslides. The purpose of the flights was to allow geologists and hydrologists to assess the 
eminent risk of loss of life to responders from further slides and flooding, as well as to gain a more comprehensive un-
derstanding of the event. The AirRobot AR100B in conjunction with PrecisionHawk postprocessing software created 
two-dimensional (2D) and 3D reconstructions of the inaccessible “moonscape” region of the slide and provided engi-
neers with a real-time remote presence assessment of river mitigation activities. The AirRobot was able to cover 30–
40 acres from an altitude of 42 m (140 ft) in 48 min of flight time and generate interactive 3D reconstructions in 3 h on 
a laptop in the field. The deployment is the 17th known use of SUAS for disasters, and it illustrates the evolution of 
SUASs from tactical data collection platforms to strategic data-to-decision systems. It was the first known instance in 
the United States in which an airspace deconfliction plan allowed a UAS to operate with manned vehicles in the same 
airspace during a disaster. It also describes how public concerns over SUAS safety and privacy led to the cancellation 
of initial flights. The deployment provides lessons on operational considerations imposed by the terrain, trees, power 
lines, and accessibility, and a safe human:robot ratio. The article identifies open research questions in computer vi-
sion, mission planning, and data archiving, curation, and mining.   
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protect responders working on recovering victims and mit-
igating flooding. Figure 1 shows the slide. The riparian sec-
tion of the slide, dubbed the “moonscape,” and the inter-
section of the scarp and moonscape, called the “toe,” were 
inaccessible by foot or ground vehicle due to quicksand-like 
mud that was over 6 meters deep. The moonscape, toe, and 
lower portions of the scarp could not be sensed with satellite 
remote sensing with sufficient resolution. Manned helicop-
ters could not acquire a complete survey because of the need 
to stay at altitudes higher than 500 feet for safety reasons, as 
the narrow canyon produces unpredictable gusts and there 
was a danger that debris loosened by the rotor wash would 
be sucked into the rotors and cause a crash. The expense of 
manned helicopters precluded daily use for a rapidly chang-
ing situation: the rule of thumb from the 2014 AUVSI/AIAA 
Civilian Applications of Unmanned Aerial System (CAUAS) 
workshop was that manned helicopters cost 10 times more 
than a SUAS, i.e., about $250 an hour versus $25 an hour. The 
available LIDAR data from manned assets were taking 2–4 
days for processing and subsequent release to the respond-
ers in the field. 
The Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station’s Center 
for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR) provided 
three commercially available small SUASs—two fixed-wings 
and one rotorcraft—through its Roboticists Without Borders 
(RWB) program. The flights make at least three contribu-
tions. First, they were the first SUAS flights reported specif-
ically for mudslides. Thus they add another case study to the 
growing corpus of SUAS applications, as well as providing 
insight into platforms, operations, and open research ques-
tions. Second, the flights exemplify the evolution of SUASs 
from data collection platforms to data-to-decision systems, 
where the system collects data and converts it to actionable 
information readily comprehended by decision makers. 
Third, the flights illustrate the increasing impact of regula-
tions and societal concerns. SUAS flights for the 2013 floods 
in Boulder, CO were suspended due to the lack of adherence 
to regulations (9News, 2013). The SR-530 flights reported 
in this article occurred under a novel airspace deconfliction 
plan approved by the Federal Aviation Agency that allowed 
manned operations in the same area. However, misunder-
standings about regulations within the emergency response 
community and public perception of privacy caused initial 
flights to be cancelled. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews pre-
vious and related work in disaster robotics. Section 3 de-
scribes the general missions and selection of platforms using 
the criteria established in Murphy (2014). Section 4 describes 
the initial deployment in March 2014, which resulted in zero 
flights. The Insitu Scan Eagle could not find a staging area 
that had sufficient space for launch and landing, the Preci-
sionHawk Lancaster was not granted an emergency certifi-
cate of authorization (COA), and the AirRobot flights were 
canceled due to concerns over privacy. Section 5 describes 
how the team returned and on April 23, 2014 flew an Air-
Robot AR100B quadrotor under an emergency COA with 
postprocessing by Precision Hawk producing a two-dimen-
sional (2D) mosaic and 3D interactive reconstruction of 30–
40 acres of the moonscape with 48 min of flight time and 3 h 
of processing time on a laptop. The general performance of 
the SUAS, the lessons learned for operations, the human-ro-
bot ratio for the missions, and gaps and open research ques-
tions are discussed in Section 6. The article concludes in Sec-
tion 7 that SUASs are cost- and time-effective for mudslide 
response. 
2. Prior And Related Work 
SUAS use has been reported for 17 disasters, including the 
SR-530 mudslide incident and a subsequent 2014 mudslide in 
Collbran, CO. Deployments to 11 of the 17 disasters are ana-
lyzed in the book Disaster Robotics (Murphy, 2014): Hurricane 
Katrina, USA (2005); Hurricane Wilma, USA (2005); Berk-
man Plaza II Collapse, USA (2007); L’aqulia Earthquake, Italy 
(2009); Haiti Earthquake (2010); Christchurch Earthquake, 
New Zealand (2011); Tohoku Earthquake, Japan (2011); Fu-
kushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, Japan (2011); Evange-
los Florakis Naval Base Explosion, Cyprus (2011); Thailand 
Floods (2011); and Finale Emilia Earthquake, Italy (2012). The 
deployment to Typhoon Morakot, Taiwan (2009) is reported 
in Adams & Friedland (2011). The deployments to Typhoon 
Haiyan, Philippines (2013) (University of Hawai’i, 2014; UH, 
2014); the Boulder, CO floods, USA (2013) (9News, 2013); the 
Collbran, CO mudslide, USA (2014) (Yoanna, 2014); and the 
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina floods (2014) (ICARUS, 2014) 
were reported in the media. 
The SR-530 flights differ from prior work. No SUAS de-
ployments prior to the SR-530 event were for mudslides, 
which consist of a vertical scarp and horizontal deposits of 
Figure 1. SR-530 mudslide labeled with regions of interest.  
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mud downslope. The 2011 Thailand Floods and the 2013 
Typhoon Haiyan missions specifically looked at flooding. 
These deployments are especially relevant because flooding 
is a continuing consequence of the engagement of the Still-
aguamish River in the SR-530 mudslide, and thus they are 
compared to the SR-530 deployment below. No pre-2014 de-
ployment reported postprocessing for 3D reconstruction of 
terrain, although 2D mosaics were implied in University of 
Hawai’i (2014) and UH (2014). 
2.1. Relevant CRASAR Deployments 
CRASAR deployed SUASs to five of the 17S UAS events (Ka-
trina, Wilma, Berkman Plaza II, L’aquila, and Fukushima 
Daiichi) prior to the SR-530 mudslide. SUAS protocols de-
veloped by CRASAR were used by teams at two other events 
(Evangelos Florakis, Finale Emilia). CRASAR had also de-
ployed unmanned ground robots to help search collaterally 
damaged houses at the La Conchita, CA Mudslide (2005). 
The La Conchita mudslide was significantly different from 
the SR350 slide in that it was a narrow slide of about 0.035 
km2  with a claylike solid mud that supported the weight 
of responders and equipment. One of the recommendations 
from that deployment was to use robots to monitor the mud-
slide (Murphy & Stover, 2008); the SR-530 deployment is 
thus a logical extension of the 2005 deployment. 
2.2. 2011 Thailand Flooding 
The 2011 Thailand Floods was the first event in which 
SUASs are known to have been specifically used for flood 
assessment. Siam UAV Industries deployed an eSUAV600 
small electric-powered fixed wing with roughly a 2.5 m 
wing span and video cameras for 3 months in 2011 to as-
sist the Thai government with the major flooding event (Sri-
varee-Ratana, 2012). The mission was to provide video of 
the water movement and the status of mitigation work to 
engineers and officials so that they could better control the 
flooding and evacuate the population. Siam UAV Industries 
obtained permission from the government to fly. The air-
space was divided by the government into manned and un-
manned regions in order to prevent possible collisions with 
news helicopters flying at low altitudes. The missions were 
successful, but lessons learned emphasized the need to an-
notate and curate the large amount of video, as geotagging 
was not sufficient. 
2.3. 2013 Typhoon Haiyan 
A set of fixed-wing SUASs with video cameras was deployed 
by the University of Hawai’i Hilo to the 2013 Typhoon Hai-
yan (UH, 2014; University of Hawai’i, 2014) for general vi-
sual mapping surveys including the Aklan river system at 
Panay. The team used a custom-built fixed-wing SUAS with 
approximately a 1.5 m wing span. Work was directed by an 
organization called Skyeye associated with the Ateneo de 
Manila University, and the data were provided to local gov-
ernments. The value of surveying the river system was to 
understand and prevent additional flooding. The UH Hilo 
team described that they added “first person view” [gener-
ally referred to as remote presence (Murphy & Burke, 2008; 
Tittle, Roesler, &Woods, 2002) in the cognitive engineering 
and human-robot interaction literature] so that the respond-
ers could actively manage missions and for general safety. 
The team also cited difficulties with the weather and with 
finding launch sites. 
Other SUAS platforms were reported in the media as be-
ing used at Typhoon Haiyan for general damage assessment 
and general mapping, but not flood assessment. Some nota-
ble examples are Team Rubicon, which deployed a Huginn 
X1 quadrotor with a camera and IR (Net Hope Center, 2014), 
and unspecified humanitarian relief organizations support-
ing Open Street Maps (OpenStreetMap, 2014). There was no 
discussion of flight altitudes, airspace regulations, or air-
space deconfliction with manned assets operating in the 
same area, although one website reported that the Philip-
pine Civil Aviation Authority had restricted flights to Taclo-
ban City to relief effort flights only. 
2.4. Similarities and Differences with SR-530 Deployments 
The SR-530 Mudslide deployments are most similar to the 
Typhoon Haiyan deployment. They shared a similar moti-
vation to mitigate risk to citizens (and responders) from cur-
rent and future flooding. Both the RWB and UH Hilo teams 
had difficulty in finding staging areas and were prevented 
by weather from flying some flights. In both cases, the plat-
form and payload selection were made on the presumption 
of mapping missions, but the need for a remote presence 
emerged in the field. 
The SR-530 deployments are different from the Thailand 
Floods and Typhoon Haiyan deployments. Those deploy-
ments relied solely on fixed wing, not rotorcraft, and the vi-
sualizations appear to be limited to 2D mosaics versus 3D in-
teractive reconstructions. The airspace in both cases was not 
restricted in the areas in which they appeared to be working, 
and thus it was open to news helicopters and other response 
workers, whereas the airspace in the SR-530 event was un-
der a temporary flight restriction (TFR) barring entry of all 
aircraft except those authorized through the incident com-
mand process. The Asian deployments appeared to have de-
conflicted airspace either by explicitly sterilizing the airspace 
or through some informal method. 
3. Premission Selection of Platforms 
On March 27, 2014, CRASAR received an invitation to fly 
SUASs in order to provide data for the geological and hy-
drological teams through the Snohomish County Sheriff Ur-
ban Search and Rescue Air Operations branch, facilitated by 
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the field innovation team (FIT), a disaster response nonprofit 
that delivers innovative solutions, real-time, to help first re-
sponders and disaster survivors. 
3.1. Tactical and Strategic Mission Objectives 
The initial mission scope as described prior to arrival had 
three objectives, two of which required advanced data pro-
cessing and visualization for strategic decision makers. The 
first objective was to aid tactical teams in anticipating and 
mitigating ongoing flooding by providing comprehensive 
imagery. The responders were concerned that the continu-
ing rain in the region combined with the dynamically chang-
ing river course could lead to significant flooding. Flooding 
could impact other residents but also the responders work-
ing downslope on recovery, creating a second disaster. The 
second objective was to provide a rapid 3Dreconstruction 
of the site and then use that to create a 3D printed map of 
the terrain. FIT provided access to Autodesk as ReCap real-
ity capture, a cloud-point image-based 3D modeling soft-
ware, and an Objet 500 Connex 3D printer. The 3D printed 
map would complement a 3D graphics reconstruction and 
also serve as a physical artifact for the responders to work 
over together, thus offering a similar but different visual-
ization capability. The third objective was to collect imagery 
over several days to anticipate further slide movement so as 
to protect the responders. Note that there was no mission to 
search for survivors or for victim recovery. 
3.2. Platform Selection 
Following Disaster Robotics (Murphy, 2014), the choice of 
platforms from within the Roboticists Without Borders mem-
bership was based on four questions: What are the expected 
(and unarticulated) needs for the robot? What are the transpor-
tation and logistical arrangements? How will maintenance and 
repairs be conducted? and Are there any regulatory issues that 
must be considered? The answer to the fourth question was 
that all platforms would require an emergency COA from 
the FAA to fly. The first three questions produced the fol-
lowing set of criteria: 
• Prior use for geospatial missions. Reliable platforms that 
had existing payloads and demonstrated post-pro-
cessing for accurate, georeferenced 2D tiling and 3D 
reconstruction were needed. 
• Rapid coverage and reconstruction. The SR-350 slide was 
approximately 2.5 km2. The general expectation was 
that the entire process—flight and postprocessing—
should occur within 1 day, preferably within one 12-h 
shift so that the data could be used for planning the 
next day’s activities. 
• Portability. It was expected that SUASs and operator 
control stations would have to be manually carried to 
a suitable launch site inside the disaster zone. 
• Ability to fly in regional weather. Washington State is sub-
ject to rain. While SUASs generally are not permit-
ted to operate in rain due to the lack of visibility, it 
is desirable to be able to operate in light rain so that 
the platform could get wet as it was returning home. 
CRASAR invited Insitu and PrecisionHawk to join the de-
ployment under the Roboticists Without Borders program, 
where they donate their time and travel costs, and they ab-
sorb any damage or loss to the platform. The expectation 
was to bring two complementary fixed-wings, namely the 
Insitu Scan Eagle and the PrecisionHawk Lancaster, with 
geospatial sensing and postprocessing capabilities, and to 
bring the CRASAR AirRobot AR100B quadrotors as a backup 
(see Figure 2). It should be noted that over two dozen SUAS 
systems are commercially available that support geospatial 
missions; these two can be considered representative of the 
emerging industry. 
The AirRobot AR100B is a man-portable rotorcraft weigh-
ing 1.8 kg with vertical takeoff and landing with operations in 
up to 15 knots, and flight durations of 8–20 min within about 3 
km. It is typically used at altitudes between 9 and 122 m AGL. 
It is used primarily for military or border security applica-
tions, where the real-time low-resolution imagery from a RGB 
camera is used to investigate situations or track activity. The 
Panasonic Lumix 10 megapixel camera transmits a 640 × 480 
viewfinder image over 802.11 b/g/n in real time; this low-reso-
lution viewfinder image is used for teleoperation. The AR100B 
can take manually high-resolution still imagery, but software 
upgrades for automated image collection for use with postpro-
cessing software was not available at the time of the deploy-
ment. Other payloads, such as fused video and thermal im-
aging, were not available on loan from the manufacturer. The 
platform can operate in a light rain. The AirRobot was chosen 
as a backup platform because it could be launched vertically 
and because it could provide responders with tactical, on-de-
mand oversight of the general area. 
The Insitu Scan Eagle is a fixed-wing UAS with a wing 
span of 3.1 m and a weight of 14 kg. It requires a short run-
way to launch and land and is supported by three tractor-
trailer units. It was chosen despite its larger size, weight, and 
staging needs, because it is used extensively by the U.S. Geo-
logical Survey, it is arguably the best known UAS for geospa-
tial application, and because the company is based in nearby 
Oregon and could respond quickly. 
The PrecisionHawk Lancaster is a fixed-wing man-porta-
ble SUAS with a 1.2 m wing span, weighing 2.5 kg. It is hand-
launched with operations in up to 25 knots of wind and the 
platform belly-lands as opposed to having landing gear un-
less landing in water, at which time floats can be employed. 
It can be landed either automatically or manually. The Lan-
caster is primarily used for agricultural and terrain mapping 
at altitudes of 30.5–183 m above ground level using video, LI-
DAR, or thermal payloads. It has flight durations of approx-
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imately 60 min and can map a 2.6 km2 area in under 2 h. The 
reconstructions can be generated from either video or line-
scanning LIDAR payloads, with 3 cm per pixel processed in 
3–72 h. The LIDAR payload was not available for the mud-
slide deployments. The Lancaster was chosen because of its 
high degree of portability and flexibility in staging, postpro-
cessing software for terrain reconstruction, and the ability to 
fly in light rain. 
4. March 2014 Deployment 
The team assembled on March 28, 2014, and demobilized 
on March 30. The team was directed by Robin Murphy 
(CRASAR), with Brittany Duncan (CRASAR) as the pilot-
in-command. Tyler Collins was the lead pilot for Precision-
Hawk, with Pat Lohman as field support. Kevin Cole and 
Travis Cieloha were the lead pilots for Insitu. Frank San-
born (FIT) served as the liaison with the incident command 
management team but had no direct responsibilities for the 
SUAS. Friday, March 28 was spent waiting for the three 
teams to arrive and scouting staging areas that could serve 
as takeoff and landing zones and provide visibility for line-
of-sight operations. The deployment resulted in zero flights 
due to environmental constraints eliminating the Insitu and 
county concerns over safety and privacy, despite meeting 
FAA regulations. 
4.1. Environmental Constraints on Operations 
The Insitu Scan Eagle demobilized on the afternoon of March 
28 due to a lack of a suitable staging area within the TFR. 
The temporary heliport at Skagland that was being used by 
manned helicopters had sufficient space and access, but there 
was a possibility of radio interference between the Black 
Hawks and Scan Eagle, as well as complicated coordination 
issues. No other site was found. 
The CRASAR and PrecisionHawk representatives scouted 
for a location that could be used by both platforms. A tem-
porary emergency access south of SR-530 was ruled out due 
to radio-frequency interference from overhead power lines 
[Figure 3(a)]. It also would have required over a 400 m hike 
over a steep muddy hill; see Figure 3(b). A meadow at the 
Shunn property off Whitman Road was identified as the best 
option. It would not require a hike but it did require permis-
sion from the landowner, a four-wheel-drive vehicle to go 
off road, and there was a danger of a secondary slide. The lo-
cation would also necessitate two safety officers in order to 
maintain constant line of sight with the SUAS. One would 
be with the flight team on the west side of the slope, and the 
second would be stationed on the south side of the slide and 
communicate with the team via radio. 
4.2. Mission Objectives 
The mission objectives in order of priority are given below, 
with the areas for each mission shown in Figure 4. The refine-
ment of missions introduced one surprise: that the quadrotor 
had a mission and was no longer strictly a backup aircraft. 
The expectation was to use the PrecisionHawk Lancaster fly-
ing at 137 m AGL for priorities 2–4, with follow-up flights if 
needed by the AR100B rotorcraft to investigate areas of in-
terest from 30.5 m or less. However, for priority 1, the “hover 
and stare” capability of the AR100B was considered essential 
in allowing the Army Corps of Engineers to access the flow 
patterns and general movement of the water. A flight might 
be able to meet multiple objectives. 
• Priority 1: Riverbed assessment (blue). Washington Task 
Force 1, the state team conducting rescue and recov-
ery operations, wanted the river bed cleared so the 
pond area would drain and they could search the wa-
terlogged area. Low-altitude, high-resolution data 
would aid hydrologists in making decisions on where 
blockages are and how to clear them. 
• Priority 2: High resolution of lower slide (yellow). The ge-
ologists wanted a better understanding of the scarp, 
particularly at the toe. Low-altitude, high-resolution 
data would aid in identifying potential problem ar-
eas that would lead to more slides or make further 
changes in the river. 
• Priority 3: High resolution of cliff face/upper slide (green). 
Washington Task Force 1 wanted to project secondary 
slides because even a small slide could impact search 
                                                   (a)                                                                   (b)                                                                           (c)
Figure 2. Roboticists Without Borders platforms selected for deployment: (a) the AirRobot AR100B, (b) the Insitu Scan Eagle, and (c) the Preci-
sionHawk Lancaster.  
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operations taking place in water. Low-altitude, high-
resolution data would aid in making decisions on 
where small slides might occur and how to clear them. 
• Priority 4: High resolution of “moonscape” (orange). The 
geologists and hydrologists needed clear imagery for 
planning since the area was inaccessible by foot. Low-
altitude, high-resolution data would aid in making 
decisions on potential access sites (how firm was the 
ground? was there ponding of water?). 
4.3. Regulatory Constraints on Operations 
FAA regulations placed constraints on the SUAS operation. 
To legally fly, an emergency COA had to be issued for each 
platform. The key component of the emergency COA was a 
novel airspace deconfliction plan that allowed manned and 
unmanned aircraft to operate over the same area. The emer-
gency COA required an existing COA for each platform and 
an airspace deconfliction plan approved by the group respon-
sible for flights in the area. The FAA was extremely supportive 
and remained on standby 24/7 throughout the weekend and 
continuously provided feedback as the emergency COA forms 
were filled in. The emergency COA process also required a 
separate email from the incident commander to confirm that 
the SUASs were needed due to eminent risk of loss of life. 
Manned aircraft operations were essential at the mud-
slides. The FAA had already declared a temporary flight re-
striction (TFR), which serves as an aviation “do not enter” 
zone to protect the helicopters that were used for extracting 
survivors; see Figure 5. For the initial phase of the rescue 
and recovery, responders had to be transported via helicop-
ter until a boardwalk was built through the viscous mud and 
Figure 4. Map of the March 2014 objectives overlaid on a pre-mudslide Google Earth map. The over-
all boundary is shown in red, with priority 1 airspace in blue, 2 in yellow, 3 in green, and 4 in orange. 
Figure 3. Examples of the difficulty in staging the SUAS: (a) A candidate staging area with sufficient line of sight and minimal risk of fly-
ing over responders, but with power lines creating a navigation hazard and radio interference, and (b) the 400 m trail over a muddy hill 
to reach that site.  
                                                                  (a)                                                                                                                       (b)
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remained on standby for emergency extraction. These tacti-
cal operations meant the helicopters were operating at 61 m 
above ground level (AGL), and they were extremely vulner-
able to debris being sucked into a rotor. At those altitudes, 
even a small bird could cause a crash. A crash would not 
only risk the helicopter’s inhabitants, but the survivors and 
workers in the area below the helicopter as well. 
In the event that a helicopter in these situations sees an 
unknown aircraft or SUAS, the helicopter must discontinue 
the mission and return to its staging area until the offend-
ing aircraft is identified or leaves the airspace. For example, 
operations at the mudslide were suspended when a manned 
float plane entered the TFR without permission and landed 
during the initial rescue operations. Likewise the use of 
manned helicopters for low-altitude operations at the mud-
slides was clearly essential but at risk from a SUAS operat-
ing in what would normally be an acceptable altitude under 
122 m associated with Class G “hobbyist” airspace. 
Previously, the most straightforward way to coordinate 
manned and unmanned aircraft has been to “sterilize” the 
airspace, allowing only one or the other type of craft to enter 
the area for scheduled periods. An Air Space Deconfliction 
Plan was created in collaboration with Snohomish County 
Sheriff’s Office chief pilot William Quistorf and the onsite 
Air Operations Branch. The Air Operations Branch directly 
coordinated flights within the TFR and also performed any 
necessary coordination with the overall Air Traffic Control 
system through Seattle Center. The primary objective of the 
plan was to segregate manned and unmanned flights but al-
low them to fly simultaneously while creating a protocol to 
discontinue unmanned operations if a helicopter had to fly 
through the canyon at a low altitude. There were four key 
elements to the plan: 
• Manned and unmanned aircraft separation. During any 
normally scheduled flights, the air space was decon-
flicted via a “rack-and-stack” approach to maintain 
500 feet (152.4 m) vertical separation between air-
craft, where the UAVs would not fly above a 500-foot 
(152.4 m) ceiling and the manned operations would 
not breach a 1,000- foot (304.8 m) floor. The FAA re-
quires at least a 500-foot (152.4 m) separation between 
any aircraft. 
• Manned flights take precedence if separation could not be 
maintained. To allow for emergency rescue flights 
by the helicopters, which meant they would have 
to breach the 304.8 m floor, it was explicitly stated 
that manned flights took precedence over unmanned 
flights and that the maximum time to land for any un-
manned flights would be less than 1.5 min. This en-
sured that if a manned helicopter had to perform an 
emergency evacuation of the responders, the SUAS 
would be able to land before the helicopters came 
close enough to be vulnerable. 
• A SUAS team member(s) attend daily Air Branch meetings. 
The expected area for SUAS flying and timing were 
discussed in an early morning meeting with the en-
tire air branch, including all supervisors and pilots 
so that manned flight teams were aware that there 
would be unmanned flights below them. The radio 
protocols were set in this meeting to allow coordina-
tion throughout the day as flights were scheduled or 
requested. Although not required by the emergency 
COA, the SUAS team representatives also attended 
the short daily Operations Branch meetings at 0600 to 
coordinate access to the staging area and to maintain 
personnel accountability for team safety, i.e., that a 
Figure 5. Extraction flight showing the low altitude of the helicopter and risk to 
personnel on the ground from a crash. Courtesy of Northwest Regional Aviation.  
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six-person SUAS team with two cars would be work-
ing in a particular Division and Section that day. The 
meetings also made other responders aware that the 
team was authorized to fly, was not from the media, 
and what data would be available to them. 
• The SUAS team flew on demand. The SUAS team was al-
lowed to fly on demand, versus at specifically sched-
uled times, within the designated area by monitoring 
the Air Branch radio frequency and broadcasting on 
the tactical air branch radio channel that they were 
about to fly and had landed. The team was allowed 
to change staging areas and move about without re-
porting in as long as they stayed within the parame-
ters set at the morning meeting. 
It should be noted that the emergency COA process did 
not hold up flights per se, as approval would have been 
nearly instantaneous given a complete application. The time-
consuming element was finding realistic staging sites and 
communicating them to the FAA. The coordination with the 
Air Operations Branch was short and straightforward, did 
not preclude on-demand flights, and should not be used as 
a reason to argue against SUASs coordinating with manned 
air traffic control arrangements. 
The addition to the emergency COA process of a sepa-
rate email from the incident commander prevents an agency 
participating in the response from requesting an emergency 
COA without the larger incidence command staff approval. 
This serves two purposes. It explicitly states the relationship 
of the missions to eminent loss of life, which is required for 
an emergency COA. It also helps to ensure that the flights 
are coordinated within the larger use of aerial assets. For ex-
ample, in a disaster spread over a large geographical area, 
such as a hurricane, a sheriff’s department or other agency 
may have access to UASs but be unaware that the manned 
helicopters are being tasked to work at low altitudes in the 
same area, which was the problem with the Boulder, CO 
flood flights. 
4.4. Cancellation Due to Public Safety and Privacy Concerns 
No flights were conducted as the Snohomish Office of Emer-
gency Management internally canceled the flights and the 
incident commander did not email the FAA. The county 
held the incorrect perception that manned and unmanned 
systems could not fly in the same airspace. After meetings 
with officials on March 30, the team and the Air Operations 
Branch clarified that the airspace deconfliction plan did al-
low manned and unmanned aircraft to fly, they rewrote a 
jargon-free version of the airspace deconfliction plan, and 
they resubmitted the request for flights. The Incident Com-
mander, Larry Nickey, then formally raised concerns of pri-
vacy and viewing of personally identifiable information (PII). 
Mr. Nickey indicated that at least one family had expressed 
concerns about drone operators seeing bodies of loved ones, 
and thus he did not approve the flights, though he might at 
a future date. It was unclear if the families understood that 
the SUASs were being proposed to fly over the moonscape in 
order to protect workers and mitigate further flooding, and 
they were not being flown over the victim recovery area in 
order to search for victims. 
5. April 2014 Deployment 
The team was invited to return on April 17, 2014, and was on-
site April 22–24, 2014. Four previous members (Collins, Dun-
can, Murphy, and Sanborn) returned. Justin Kendrick, Preci-
sionHawk, was substituted for Pat Lohman. A new member 
was added, Tamara Palmer, who is a communication strat-
egist with FIT. The FAA did not grant an emergency COA 
for the PrecisionHawk Lancaster, as a regular COA for the 
platform had not completed FAA approval at that time, but 
the AirRobot AR100B emergency COA was approved. The 
AirRobot AR100B flew seven flights on April 23, but it was 
unable to fly on April 24 due to weather. A total of 33 GB of 
data were collected from image and video data from the Air-
Robot AR100B quadrotor, including raw and postprocessed 
imagery; photos and video of the robot in flight and the con-
text taken by the team members; and flight logs and ethno-
graphic observations. 
5.1. Operational Differences from March Deployment 
Staging for the April deployment was easier as the team 
could drive directly to staging areas without hiking and 
could use the roadway as a launch and landing zone. A por-
tion of SR-530 on the Darrington side of the slide was now 
open, and a temporary road from Oso to Darrington had 
been completed. There was also a temporary road near the 
river where the Army Corps of Engineers was building dikes 
to stabilize the river flow. The weather for the April deploy-
ment was similar, with intermittent rain and cloud cover. 
Since the team could drive an SUV to the site, a popup tent 
was included to protect the base station and SUAS from light 
rain. 
The flights had the same four objectives as Deployment 
1, however the priority was changed where Priority 4 Moon-
scape was number 1 and Priority 1 Riverbed Assessment was 
demoted to 2. It should be emphasized that the primary ob-
jective Moonscape was best suited for the fixed-wing as it 
could collect a larger amount of overlapping images, and 
at higher resolutions. The Riverbed Assessment was better 
suited for the rotorcraft, which could hover and stare at mov-
ing water. 
The emergency COA was the same as the March deploy-
ment since the TFR was still in place, but it was updated to 
reflect the expected flight period of April 23 and 24. The Sno-
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homish County Department of Emergency Management sent 
an email to the FAA on April 18. 
5.2. Flights 
On April 23, 2014, the AirRobot AR100B was flown seven 
times for a total of 48:18 min over an 8 h period, with a 4 h 
break for lunch off-site and recharging batteries, approxi-
mately 1.5 h waiting for intermittent rain to stop, and 0.5 h 
spent on the ground waiting for a manned helicopter flight 
to pass. Time at staging area 1 started at 08:45 and ended at 
11:30 for a lunch break and recharging. The team returned at 
15:30 to staging area 2 and was in field until 16:45. Multiple 
staging areas were needed because the short battery flight 
times of the AirRobot restricted the area that could be cov-
ered from a single staging area. The team arrived at a new 
staging site on a dike at 10:15 on April 24, 2014, but flying 
was canceled at 11:45 as the winds were gusting to 25 knots, 
beyond platform rating, and projected to increase through-
out the afternoon. 
The AirRobot was generally at an altitude of 42 m with 6 
knots of wind and overcast conditions and flown from two 
landing zones along SR-530 about 0.5 km apart. Both were 
a 3m×3m flat surface on SR-530. The staging area provided 
a clear line-of-site, and therefore a second observer was not 
needed. Five of the seven flights (44:50 min) were data col-
lection runs, with two short flights for platform checkout. 
The longest flight was 10:20 min. 
Data Flight 1 provided a 360° view of the site for context. 
Data Flight 2 addressed Priority 2. Engineering Branch 
representative Norm Skjelbreia arrived on site, creating 
an opportunistic shift in mission plans from surveying the 
moonscape to conducting the river assessment. He directed 
the flight and “hover and stare” operations in order to ob-
serve the progress of excavators working on the river chan-
nel, as well as an additional 360° view of the site. 
Data Flight 2 highlighted a disadvantage of using wifi 
viewfinder cameras as payloads. These are convenient be-
cause they transmit real-time video imagery. However, the 
video is of low resolution, in this case 640×480 pixels, and 
poor quality. As seen in Figure 6, the real-time imagery was 
so poor that neither the pilot nor the hydrologist could find 
the bright orange excavator in the imagery. Data Flight 2 also 
highlighted the advantage of having a separate mission spe-
cialist interface (Peschel & Murphy, 2015). As seen in Figure 
7, Skjelbreia is able to view on a separate laptop the real-time 
video stripped of artifacts for the pilot (e.g., battery life, al-
titude, GPS satellite coverage, etc.). This also kept him from 
having to crowd the pilot by looking over her shoulder. 
Data Flights 3, 4, and 5 (priority 1) approximated the Lan-
caster image sampling pattern and constitute the bulk of im-
agery data used for 3D reconstruction. The pilot manually 
flew the AirRobot over the “moonscape” area to approxi-
mate the pattern flown by the Lancaster while capturing still 
images with approximately 50% overlap both horizontally 
and vertically. While it is possible for CRASAR to code the 
AR100B for autonomous flight and image collection, there 
was no opportunity to test any code and the risk was too 
high. This was accomplished by flying using the viewfinder, 
and it resulted in difficulty navigating back to the stopping 
point of the previous flight. The imagery captured in these 
three flights was equal to 30–40 acres of coverage in the re-
sulting stitched images. 
5.3. Feedback on Postprocessing 
Imagery from the AirRobot was postprocessed by Precision-
Hawk using AgiSoft Photoscan software in 3 h on a laptop 
during lunch. The mosaic and 3D reconstruction are not geo-
referenced, thus they cannot be imported into Google Earth 
or similar software, because the AirRobot stills were not geo-
tagged with EXIF data when captured. The data set was in-
complete due to limited flight time and missing areas due 
to errors in manually covering the area. While a georefer-
enced reconstruction is possible with control points, no sur-
vey marks were visible in the imagery as the flights were 
over inaccessible areas. 
The 2D mosaic and 3D reconstructions from the April 
23 flights were delivered to the Engineering and Opera-
tions Branch at the incident command post at 18:25. Figure 
8 shows representative stills. Feedback at that time was that 
both 2D and 3D visualizations were considered valuable, 
but the interactive 3D reconstruction was viewed as more 
useful. The Operations Branch responders indicated that 
the lower resolution and lack of geotagging was acceptable 
given that the results could be generated on a laptop in 3 h; 
this meant that SUASs could be a tactical tool for Operations 
for immediate decision making in the field. The 3D recon-
struction was also valuable to the Engineering Branch, but 
a higher-resolution, georeferenced reconstruction would be 
even more useful. 
A 3D printed model was delivered to Snohomish County 
Public Works on July 28, 2014, and it has been used by the 
County to identify locations for a flooding bypass channel; 
the feedback has been that the 3D reconstruction and the 3D 
print have been extremely valuable for strategic decision-
making despite the lower resolution. 
6. Discussion 
Overall, the general performance of rotorcraft, despite be-
ing an older model poorly matched for the situation, met 
the technical objectives. The advances in commercial post-
processing software, in this case AgiSoft Photoscan, added 
real value to visualization of complex terrain for both tacti-
cal (immediate) and strategic (long-term) decision-makers. 
The performance of the rotorcraft suggests that the difference 
between fixed-wing and rotorcraft may come down to oper-
10 M u r p h y  e t  a l .  i n  J o u r n a l  o f  F i e l d  R o b o t i c s  ( 2 0 1 6 ) 
ational constraints. The SR-530 deployments reiterated les-
sons already learned about operational constraints in terms 
of environments, but they introduced regulatory and societal 
constraints that could not be overcome. Manpower remains a 
open discussion; the deployments suggest that a SUAS team 
for a disaster will continue to have a 3:1 or 2:1 human-to-ro-
bot ratio for the near future. The deployments reinforced 
the need for multisensor payloads for SUASs, which is well-
known. However, they also identified gaps in autonomous 
planning, especially the need to consider landing zone and 
operational constraints such as time for the return home and 
maintenance of line-of-sight. Seven short flights produced 
33 GB of data, posing challenges in data curation, archiving, 
and mining. 
6.1. General Performance 
The performance of the rotorcraft was considered outstand-
ing by the response professionals. The deployments met two 
of the three original objectives despite only covering about 
half of the desired area due to the use of an older rotorcraft 
and flight cancellations due to county concerns, weather, and 
time constraints. The flights and same-day reconstruction pro-
vided data that could be used by tactical responders to antici-
pate and mitigate flooding as well as to gain situation aware-
ness. Tactical responders saw huge advantages for an organic 
process that allowed them to collect data and process them 
on a laptop in less than a day. Here speed and convenience 
trumps resolution. The imagery plus the AgiSoft Photoscan 
Figure 7. External view of Data Flight 2 showing (a) the AirRobot 100B in-flight and (b) separate displays 
for the hydrologist Norman Skjelbreia (right) and the pilot Brittany Duncan (left). The yellow cases are 
the backpackable base stations—the active station and a spare base station not in use except as a table. 
Figure 6. Data Flight 2 showing (a) the low-resolution real-time display where the yellow and orange excavators cannot be seen, and (b) 
the high-resolution still image where the yellow excavator can be clearly seen on the left and the orange excavator is visible to the right.  
                                                                   (a)                                                                              (b)
                                                    (a)                                                                                                                        (b)
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postprocessing software produced 3D reconstructions, and 
later AutoDesk created a 3D printed model that has been used 
by strategic decision-makers. The 3D software visualization 
was rated by engineering and operations specialists as a suf-
ficient reason to deploy SUASs. The 3D printed model was 
viewed as an exciting and desirable tool, especially if it could 
be generated within 2–4 days. The deployments were unable 
to meet the third objective of providing multiday series of 
imagery due to the initial flight cancellations. The flights did 
help hydrologists better understand the evolving terrain, but 
flights in March would have been more effective in anticipat-
ing and mitigating the initial flooding. 
The technical objectives were largely met by postpro-
cessing software, which is independent of platform. While a 
fixed-wing is better suited for wide-area coverage, sufficient 
data can be gathered by a rotorcraft. The AR100B quadro-
tor represents a worst case: it was over five years old, it was 
not using new batteries, which get over 30 min flight time, 
and it did not have autonomous flight and imagery collec-
tion software. Newer models such as the AR180 can fly in 
the 20–30 knot regime, which would have allowed an addi-
tional day in April. 
The real barriers to performance were initially societal 
and then regulatory. The misunderstanding of regulations 
and fear of inappropriate use of “drones” caused the cancel-
lation of flights at a time when it would have had a larger 
impact on the response. Once those issues were rectified, 
the biggest technical barrier to meeting the objectives was 
the inability to fly a fixed-wing designed for rapid coverage 
and geospatial data collection. The core problem was regu-
latory: the inability to get an emergency COA for the Preci-
sionHawk platform. The weather produced high winds, rain, 
fog, and low visibility, which limited the AR100B flights but 
would have also impacted a fixed-wing. 
6.2. Lessons Learned for Operations 
The deployments illustrate three general principles in de-
ploying SUASs for disasters (Murphy, 2014): the systems 
must be portable, the actual missions will be different from 
the expected missions, so having multiple systems to handle 
these unanticipated tasks or constraints is important, and re-
sponders will always want remote presence capabilities even 
if the mission is nominally automated data collection. These 
three principles are not new, but the SR-530 mudslides do 
pose a warning as to specialization of platforms. The Preci-
sionHawk Lancaster, like many geospatial and precision ag-
riculture platforms, was specialized for autonomous data col-
lection. It did not allow real-time viewing of the video data. 
However, when planning the missions with the Engineer-
ing Branch on March 29 and April 22, it was clear that the 
responders had expected to at least passively view what the 
SUAS was seeing or be able to interrupt the preprogrammed 
flight path and direct it to a different area. The opportunis-
tic use of the AirRobot to check on the riverbank mitigation 
efforts was one of five data flights, essentially 20% of the de-
ployment. Not having a remote presence (first person view) 
capability would not have led to a rejection of the technol-
ogy, but it would have hampered its utility. 
6.3. Human-Robot Ratio 
The human-robot ratio was 3:1 in March and 2:1 or 3:1 in 
April, depending on the mission. In the March deployment, 
the flight team for the AirRobot consisted of three people: a 
pilot, a safety officer colocated with the pilot, and a remote 
safety officer stationed across the slide. The PrecisionHawk 
team would have consisted similarly of a three-person team. 
Note that two safety officers were required not only due to 
the FAA requirements to maintain line-of-sight, which could 
have been satisfied with just the distributed safety officer, but 
also to safeguard the pilot. The pilot should not have been 
deployed alone, and the safety officer would be more alert 
to warnings on a secondary slide. The manpower could in-
crease if the Engineering Branch sent an engineer to serve as 
a mission specialist, opportunistically directing data collec-
tion, as was seen in the April deployment. 
The April deployments had more favorable staging, and 
there was no need for a second safety officer so the nominal 
ratio was 2:1. Even with autonomous data collection soft-
ware, the ratio would still be 2:1 for two reasons. One is that 
a person looking between a display and the SUAS quickly 
loses the platform in the background of the mountains; the 
choice is to maintain constant line-of-sight following FAA 
Figure 8. Example sites for Phase 1 operations: (a) the 2D mosaic showing missing images, and (b) a view 
from the interactive 3D reconstruction.     
(b)(a)
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regulations or to completely trust the autonomy. The sec-
ond reason is that teams will work in at least groups of two 
for personal safety. However, in remote presence, the pres-
ence of an engineer changed the ratio to 3:1. In all cases, a 
safety officer was more than an observer; they needed to un-
derstand the normal flight patterns of the SUAS so that they 
could alert the pilot to subtle, potential problems. 
6.4. Gaps and Open Research Questions 
The deployments highlight gaps in sensing encountered on 
previous SUAS deployments (Murphy, 2014). Thermal sens-
ing might have improved the identification of the extent of 
flooding, as it was difficult to visually distinguish water from 
the mud. LIDAR would have produced more accurate 3D 
reconstructions, and miniaturized prototypes suitable for 
SUASs are coming on the market. Multisensor payloads are 
needed; given the large area to cover and the need for rapid 
coverage, it is unrealistic to expect to fly with one payload 
and then repeat with a different payload. 
The mudslide flights also suggest that more work is 
needed in flexible autonomous systems and planning. It 
would be useful to divide the site into an optimal set of re-
gions that can be flown from the available staging areas and 
satisfy constraints such as remaining in visual line-of-sight 
and being able to return home and land within N minutes, 
where N is specified by a COA. Planning and geospatial rea-
soning to determine possible staging areas and observer po-
sitions to maintain line of site from a priori data would also 
be desirable. 
The data set from just one day of flying was 33 GB, imply-
ing that data curation (archiving, retrieval, and data mining) 
will be problematic. Data were heterogeneous, consisting of 
video, images, external views, and flight logs. Different cam-
eras and sources used different file-naming conventions. The 
use of cloud processing services was impractical with a cell 
phone data connection. The problem will be exacerbated by 
future planned missions, which will add more data for com-
parative analysis. Data are currently collected and stored us-
ing the RESPOND-R format (Shrewsbury, Henkel, Kim, & 
Murphy, 2013), where the file names support basic retrieval 
functions. The data curation functionality will need to ad-
dress queries such as all views of a location, all data of type d for 
a short time period (e.g., a flight or a day), and all data of type 
d for a long time period (e.g., seasons). Accessing data must be 
complemented with tools to allow analysis, such as how to 
detect and visualize differences over time. 
7. Conclusions 
The SR-530 mudslide was the first reported use of small 
unmanned aerial systems (SUASs) for a mudslide. It adds 
to the corpus of understanding of robots fielded under ex-
treme conditions, regulatory constraints, and societal con-
fusion and fears of drones. The deployments also contrib-
ute a case study of a new style of SUAS missions in which 
the platform is less important than the postprocessing for vi-
sualization of the data. The SR-530 mission exemplifies the 
evolution of SUAS from platforms enabling data collection 
to a data-to-decision system, where the system collects data 
and converts them to actionable information readily com-
prehended by decision makers. In this case, a low-resolu-
tion interactive 3D reconstruction of the site was sufficient 
for both tactical and strategic decision makers. A 3D printed 
model was ranked the most valuable outcome. The SR-530 
deployments produced a novel airspace deconfliction plan 
approved by the FAA that allows manned and unmanned 
aircraft to work in the same airspace. 
The choice of platform was based on previously demon-
strated geospatial payload and postprocessing capabilities, 
with the Insitu and PrecisionHawk volunteering to deploy 
fixed-wing systems used for geological surveys and preci-
sion agriculture through Roboticists Without Borders. An 
older AirRobot AR100B quadrotor was included as a backup 
platform, although it had not been used for geospatial recon-
structions. In the field, the choice of SUAS was limited by 
the terrain (eliminating the Scan Eagle) and FAA regulations 
(eliminating the Lancaster). As a result, the AR100B was the 
only platform suitable for flying. Even though its camera 
payload was a lower resolution, the images were not geo-
tagged, the image locations were selected manually, and the 
coverage area was smaller per unit time than a fixed-wing, 
the data were sufficient for the AgiSoft Photoscan to produce 
a viable 3D interactive reconstruction of the “moonscape” 
within a single 12-h shift. 
The deployment goes beyond disaster response and re-
covery and contributes to an understanding of unmanned 
aerial system design for field applications in remote areas 
such as environmental protection, fish and wildlife tracking, 
and assessment of pipelines, bridges, and railways. Small 
UASs need to have higher-resolution real-time displays and 
geotagging on all imagery and video. Thermal and LIDAR 
sensors are desirable, especially if miniaturization supports 
multisensor payloads. Flight planning needs to consider 
maintaining a known return-to-home time constraint. Au-
tonomous systems should allow users to interrupt prepro-
grammed flight paths and use the platform for remote pres-
ence. The large amount of heterogeneous data, 33 GB from 
just 48 min of flight time, suggests that data archiving and 
curation will become a major issue in the near future. 
The deployment also illustrates safety and societal issues 
impacting the adoption of SUASs. The cancellation of the 
initial March deployment shows that the public’s percep-
tion of unmanned aerial systems in general, particularly with 
regard to privacy, plays a very real role in SUAS adoption. 
Regulations prevented the use of a more desirable platform. 
At the same time, it showed that the SUAS community can 
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work within regulations and why it is dangerous not to. The 
airspace deconfliction plan shows how accepting minimal 
coordination with established manned aircraft control pro-
cedures can lead to the FAA approving flights in the same 
airspace as manned systems. The use of manned helicop-
ters for tactical response is an example of why flying under 
122 m AGL as in U.S. “hobbyist rules” does not promote 
safe operations during a disaster, and why it is not permit-
ted by the FAA. 
Work is continuing on mudslides, although it is outside 
of the scope of this article. CRASAR deployed a second time 
in August, 2014, in order to provide follow-up data for the 
geologists and hydrologists to use in verifying models of the 
mudslide and river. These flights were conducted under a 
normal COA, and both the PrecisionHawk and the AirRo-
bot AR180, a larger SUAS with autonomous data collection, 
were successfully used.   
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